The Iranians are frantically looking for those responsible for infecting their nuclear and industrial facilities with Stuxnet, an extremely sophisticated and dangerous viral computer malworm.

The Iranians should also worry what could come next in this cyber war. Their country’s electrical system may fail. Valves and spigots of a sewage treatment facility could be turned open, flooding Tehran’s streets with human waste. Can that happen? Most probably, if these facilities are managed by SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems, such as the computers that were just infected.

Who were the attackers that knew how to penetrate through five zero-day “security holes,” and plant the malworm that not only attacked Iran, but infected computers in other countries as well? Since the malworm was so sophisticated, there is a consensus among experts that it was the product of a state, rather than a ploy of a hacker playing for fun.

The Iranian security services and computer experts are scrambling to rid their computers of the malworm that was “mutating and wreaking havoc on computerized industrial equipment in Iran,” according to IRNA, Iran’s government news agency. Hamid Alipour, the director of Iran Information Technology Company, a government agency added, “The attack is still ongoing and new versions of this virus are spreading.” Alipour warned, “personal computers were also being targeted by the malware although the main objective of the Stuxnet virus is to destroy industrial systems, its threat to home computer users is serious.” General Hossein Salami, Lieutenant Commander of IRGC the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps said that, “The IRGC and Army have designed defense systems for all points of the country, [and] an assuring defensive plan has also been devised for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.”

Russian technicians with unlimited access to all systems at the Bushehr nuclear reactor were questioned, while others hurried to leave Iran with their families. The Iranian Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi has announced last week that several “nuclear spies” had been arrested, but failed to identify them or their nationality.

These official statements are unusual because thus far Iran has been reluctant to admit military or security vulnerabilities. So why do it now?

The answer probably lies in the bigger picture. Iran seems to be seeking revenge against the U.S and its allies for imposing painful sanctions. Since the Iranians cannot retaliate directly against the U.S., without risking severe consequences, then why not accuse Israel of waging the cyber war, rightly or wrongly? That could give the Iranians a pretext, albeit transparent, to retaliate by directing their conflict-hungry satellite terrorist organization Hezbollah to shell Israeli civilian centers from Southern Lebanon. Is that the reason president Ahmadinejad is coming to Lebanon?

Common wisdom says that cyber wars are bloodless, smokeless and leave buildings and infrastructure intact. Or are they?

The Stuxnet attack on Iran first focused on SCADA industrial control systems that are broadly used by energy, nuclear, electrical, water, sewage treatment, telephone, and chemical companies. The damage from a cyber attack on a SCADA system could be substantial. From a temporary loss of service to a total failure with catastrophic dimensions cascading to multiple locations for an extended period. Attackers may use any of the multiple penetration options to get into the system: planting a malworm during production or installation of the SCADA device, wireless transmission of the malworm, hacking into the control system computers and linking to the modems used for the control systems’ maintenance, or physically attaching a pinky-finger-size flash drive into a computer that later would unwittingly log into a central system and contaminate it. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization confirmed last week in a speech at the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran has been fighting espionage at its nuclear facilities, and that people working at Iran’s nuclear facilities were lured by promises of better pay to pass secrets to the West. Salehi did not provide additional details, but the timing of his statement might hint how the Stuxnet malworm penetrated into Iran’s nuclear facility computers.

Once a SCADA system is accessed, the attacker can infect it with a computer malworm that could manipulate the data used for operational decisions to cause damage, or modify programs that control critical equipment to shut down or send the system haywire. The malworm can hide the changes it made and even allows remote upgrades of the malworm if countermeasures are employed by the infected target. A sophisticated malworm such as Stuxnet could potentially include code that would cause uranium enriching centrifuges to explode under high pressure, or at a certain date. Did it actually do it? There were reports that Iran’s uranium enrichment plant at the Natanz facility was attacked by Stuxnet and sustained damage. An earlier report suggested that in 2009 that site suffered a serious nuclear accident that reduced the number of uranium enriching centrifuges by at least 25%. Was Stuxnet the reason?

Therefore, can the Iranians now be confident that no additional, more serious attacks will be forthcoming? Can they be sure that no foreign intelligence agents managed to “treat” the Iranian bound SCADA systems and plant a dormant Trojan horse or a viral computer malworm that would be awakened and cause havoc on a certain date or upon a single transmitted command? To make things worse for the Iranians, many industrial control systems are linked to the location’s central computer system, thereby exposing these external computers to the contagious viral effect of the malworm. That could explain the contamination of many personal computers owned by Iranian officials who logged into their agencies’ central computer systems.

Control systems with proprietary command menus such as SCADA systems are difficult to operate by an outsider, and wrong commands would be harmless and could attract attention to the attempted break-in. That explains why thus far there were only very few intentional attacks on critical infrastructure industrial control systems that caused any damage, even when the intruders were able to break their way into the system.

However, top professionals, such as the attackers who designed Stuxnet, showed that they were able to overcome these hurdles and cause significant damage. In fact, there were probably two versions of Stuxnet. Apparently, the first version did not perform its destructive mission well, and was replaced by a viler malworm. The assumption that foreign agents were involved is supported by the fact that the attackers were able to identify the exact type of the SCADA system used by the Iranians, thereby allowing computer experts to write new code that finally did the destructive job.

The SCADA control systems include supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed control systems, and programmable logic controllers. These systems are primarily used for remote monitoring and for sending commands to valves and switches. That capability should cause serious concerns to the Iranians. Although Iranians officials express their concern regarding Stuxnet’s effect on their nuclear reactor systems, they should also worry what could potentially happen to civilian facilities.

What if, for example, a sewage treatment facility’s SCADA is taken over by attackers who would send a command to open all valves and spigots of the Tehran sewage treatment facility and flood the capital city with raw sewage? Other than the disgust and the smell, there are serious health risks: spread of disease and the contamination of fresh water supply.

A fantasy? Not really.

In 2000 in Maroochy Shire, Queensland Australia, Vitek Boden, a disgruntled former employee remotely accessed the controls of a sewage plant and discharged 800,000 liters of raw sewage into local parks and rivers, as well as the grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel. “Marine life died, the creek water turned black and the stench was unbearable for residents,” said a representative of the Australian Environmental Protection Agency.

So, whodunit to the Iranians? Information, or maybe disinformation was spread to suggest that the infection had first come from computer notebooks used by Russian engineers working at the site of Bushehr power plant. Other reports suggested that the United States has sought to devastate Iran’s nuclear program by attacking Iranian computer systems. The New York Times hinted it was Israeli Intelligence. Others were also suggesting that Israel was behind the attack because one of the Stuxnet internal computer codes included the name “myrtus”. The attack was announced during Sukkoth, a Jewish holiday that is celebrated with “the four species”, one of which is boughs with leaves from the myrtle tree. On the other hand, the “myrtus” reference could in fact be a reference to one of SCADA’s components known as RTUs (Remote Terminal Units) and that this reference is simply “My RTUs” – a tool within SCADA.

I found yet another reason that may allow conspiracy theorists to insist that Israel was the culprit; typing Stux in the Hebrew mode on a dual-language Hebrew-English keyboard, would bring the word “דאוס” God in Latin. Are the alleged attackers hinting to the wrath of God that could follow unless the Iranians stop their development of nuclear capabilities and repeated threats to destroy Israel?

This piece was originally posted in the Huffington Post on 10/12/2010

For two decades, I conducted a double life. In one, I appeared in Israeli courts on behalf of the U.S. government and other mega clients, and in the other, I was hovering around the world, conducting sensitive undercover investigations and intelligence gathering for several U.S. government agencies, mostly by trailing absconding white-collar criminals. My writing during that period was limited to legal briefs in Hebrew and reports in English to David Epstein, my supervisor.

Then, in the early 2000s, David Epstein, the sharp-minded Director of the Office of Foreign Litigation at the Justice Department at the time, told me something that changed my life forever. He said, “I’m always looking forward to reading your foreign investigation reports.” Why? I asked him, and he responded, “Because they read like thrillers.”

Shortly thereafter, I went on a U.S. government assignment to a former Soviet Republic to snoop on a particularly vile organized crime group that had started extending its tentacles to the U.S. My local contact, an INTERPOL liaison officer, came to my hotel two days after my arrival with some bad news. “Your cover has been exposed by the bad guys, we must pull you out. Don’t leave your room. We’ll bring you to the airport tomorrow morning.” It was 4:00 p.m. and I was stuck in a small hotel room with a black and white TV that spoke only Russian. But there was also a small desk, and I had my laptop. I started writing, and the words flowed from an untouched and obscure section of my subconscious, through my hand and into the word processor, as if my consciousness had nothing to do with it, and my hand — typing with two fingers — was just the medium. At 4:00 a.m., when my INTERPOL contact came to pick me up, I was already on page 100. This is how “Triple Identity,” my first thriller, was born.

Like any aspiring writer, I thought that publishers would soon line up to get me to sign up with them. I quickly found out that publishers don’t talk to writers, only to God, the Grishams and literary agents. So, I started looking for a literary agent. Dark reality soon dawned on me. Nobody answered my letters, and those few righteous that did, declined representation. One of them even wrote that he “didn’t fall in love with the thriller.” Another one suggested I buy his book on how to write and sell novels. I soon found out that his book wasn’t selling.

In the end, self-help, persistence and a little old-fashioned ingenuity did the trick, and I found not one but three publishers to commercially publish my four intelligence thrillers in hardcover, trade paperback, mass-market pocket book, audio and electronic editions.

Much to the chagrin of my wife, some of my friends said in envy that soon I would start to receive fan mail from young females. They were wrong of course. The reader mail I get is typically from members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities, telling me that reading my thrillers makes them feel like they are participating in the action. I also get mail from very eloquent retired librarians who amaze me with their deep insights and critical reading.

I no longer chase the absconding criminals, but in 20 years, I’ve had enough adventures to fill 10 thrillers, and those are just the adventures I can write about, albeit with changed names, locations and events. My earlier estimate that I would die by the bullets of some criminal I was chasing in hot pursuit did not materialize. I continue writing, and I continue litigating; therefore, quitting my jobs would also mean quitting on life.

This piece was originally published in The Huffington Post on 9/21/2010

I don’t purport to suggest that Shahram Amiri or the Iranian intelligence services read my July 13 Op Ed (in which I posed ten questions following Amiri’s public surfacing in the U.S.) and then rushed to respond. That said, Amiri’s July 15 appearance on the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting’s public television offered some answers, while simultaneously giving rise to daunting new questions.

First, a recap: On July 13 I wrote, “Shahram Amiri, an Iranian nuclear scientist, went missing in May 2009 during a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Other than the fact that Amiri subsequently resurfaced in the U.S., almost everything else in the espionage-thriller style case is disputed publicly. The barrage of information offered during the past 5 weeks makes it difficult to distinguish between genuine information, disinformation and spins.

“On June 8, 2010, in a video clip broadcast on Iranian state media, a man claiming to be Amiri said he had been kidnapped by CIA agents during a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia in 2009. ‘They took me to a house located somewhere that I didn’t know. They gave me an anesthetic injection,’ he said in the video. He then said that he was living in Tucson, Arizona, and had been subjected to eight months of ‘the most severe tortures and psychological pressures.’

“On the same day, a different video clip was posted on YouTube, appearing to have been recorded by the same person, completely contradicting the version offered in the previous video. In the second video, the person claimed to be in the United States voluntarily to continue his education, ‘I am free here and I assure everyone that I am safe.’

“In a third video broadcast on Iran state TV on June 29, 2010, a man appearing to be Dr. Amiri said, ‘I, Shahram Amiri, am a national of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a few minutes ago I succeeded in escaping U.S. security agents in Virginia. Presently, I am producing this video in a safe place. I could be re-arrested at any time.’”

Then on July 13 at 6:30pm, Amiri walked into the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, which hosts the Iran interests section, since Iran has no diplomatic ties with the U.S., and asked to return to Iran. Shortly thereafter, he flew back to Tehran unhindered.

Below are some of my original questions along with relevant statements from Amiri, as quoted by the NY Times and by Iranian Press TV, followed by new intriguing questions that Amiri’s statements raise.

2. If the person is indeed Dr. Amiri, how did he manage to escape? Wasn’t he being held in a safe, escape-proof environment guarded by U.S. intelligence community agents? Did he have outside or inside help?

Amiri said in his most recent interview that CIA and FBI agents had stormed his house in Tucson, Arizona, after he posted his first video message on the Internet. He also said that he was moved to that house, which had more comfortable residential surroundings than his military place of custody.

Amiri’s statement is a strong admission that recently, he lived freely in the U.S. This supports the U.S. position and undermines Amiri’s claim that he was in custody when he allegedly managed to escape. His new account on Iranian TV sounds more like a tale taken directly from A Thousand and One Nights, the roots of which are in ancient Arabic and Persian folklore. Why did he offer such an implausible explanation? Did he invent it or was the script written for him by the Iranian security services?

The statement is also incredible. In the first June 8 video, Amiri said he had managed to escape, and yet now he claims that he was in a house stormed by the CIA and FBI. Was it the house they provided him with? If so, why did he claim to have escaped if he was still in the house? Was it a new house traced by the CIA and FBI? If so, it’s hard to believe that, aside from forcing him to record another video in which he assures that he came to the U.S. voluntarily, the CIA and FBI just walked away. After all, they knew of Amiri’s intention to return to Iran and propagate the ‘captive’ story, per his video.

3. How did Dr. Amiri know to contact and identify his supporters? How did they know to contact and identify him? Was there a pre-arranged procedure of contact, which may support the sham defection theory?

This question remains mostly unanswered. However, in his Iranian TV interview, Amiri said, “In reality, our country’s intelligence services were able to contact me and they provided me with the necessary facilities to make my first film.”

6. In the third video he said that he had escaped a few minutes earlier. If his claim is true, then it means that Dr. Amiri was moved to an Iranian “safe house” in Virginia not far from the location where he was being held by U.S. agents. Who prepared and maintained that “safe house?”

According to the most recent version of the story, perhaps the Iranian agents he alleges helped him moved him to a safe house. Does Amiri think that the CIA and FBI agents involved would ever have let him return to Iran before they discovered and arrested any such Iranian agents? And since Amiri was allowed to board a plane back to Iran without interruption, perhaps his story about Iranian intelligence services helping him in the U.S. is yet another tale?

8. Who filmed/made the videos in which Dr. Amiri claimed to have been kidnapped?

Amiri said in the interview that after further contact with Iranian agents, he was able to hold a brief video conversation with his wife, which gave him “complete confidence” in the Iranian authorities and the well-being of his family.

Amiri did not disclose from what location he was able to hold the video conference call with his wife, however he seems to suggest that he was concerned about how the Iranian security service would treat him if he returned.

Why should he worry? He claimed that he was abducted and managed to escape. Wouldn’t that guarantee him a hero’s welcome? Or maybe Amiri correctly feared that his tale would be met with suspicion back home? When Amiri decided to return, he didn’t realize that trouble would come so soon. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said in a press conference in Tehran on Thursday that the “details of his abduction will be clarified after an investigation.” These words should put the fear of God in Amiri. Indeed, if the U.S. account is true, Amiri should start counting his days to a fateful meeting with an Iranian executioner.

Two final notes and one suggestion: When Amiri disappeared, Iranian media described him as a nuclear scientist. However when he returned to Iran, he was referred to by Iran as an “academic” or “researcher.” Is this a concerted effort to belittle Amiri’s status and his access to confidential information on Iran’s nuclear plans? Seems so: “Shahram Amiri is not a nuclear scientist and we reject it,” Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hassan Qashqavi told reporters at Imam Khomeini Airport, adding that he is a researcher in one of the universities in Iran.

Amiri said that the U.S. had offered to swap him for the three Americans, Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer and Sarah Shourd, who were arrested in the western Iranian city of Marivan for illegal entry into the country in July 2009. Iranian Press TV said that officials in Iran had dismissed the proposed swap. This sounds like another Iranian attempt to show that Amiri was a captive, not an asylum seeker.

Amiri said that the United States arranged for him to attend a university in Virginia and supplied him with a driver’s license and a Social Security number, even though, he said, he had not requested either document.

Perhaps the U.S. should release copies of Amiri’s various applications with his signature on them. If these are available, it would be interesting to hear Amiri’s explanation, if he’s available for comment.

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 7/20/2010

In June 2007 Ashraf Marwan, an Egyptian businessman, fell to his death from the balcony of his London apartment.

Did he fall, jump or get a push? These questions have lingered for the past three years and remain unanswered. If he was murdered, then his death could help us figure out whether Marwan was a loyal Israeli spy, a double Egyptian-Israeli spy or a spy with shifting loyalties.

Marwan was a son-in-law of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and a close aide to Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat. Israeli sources labeled him as the best Israeli spy ever, one who gave Israel an early warning of the break of the October 1973 war with Egypt. At the same time, he was accused by Israel’s former chief of military intelligence General Eli Zeira of being an Egyptian agent controlled by Egypt, pretending to be a spy to deceive Israel.

With two conflicting accounts regarding Marwan’s loyalty, it’s little wonder that there are multiple assumptions about how he died. If he was indeed a victim of foul play, who pushed him?

Was Marwan killed by Israeli Mossad agents attempting to prevent the publication of his memoirs, which vanished from the apartment when his death was discovered? Or maybe the assassins were Egyptian agents avenging Marwan’s alleged betrayal (if he was indeed serving Israel only)? Perhaps the assassins were unrelated to Marwan’s distant past, and his death related to his immediate past of arms deals and other businesses, including an association with Libya’s president Muammar Khadafy? Conspiracy theories aside, is it also plausible that Marwan’s death was mere accident or even suicide?

Can Marwan’s personal history shed light on his loyalties?

After completing a degree in chemistry in 1965, he joined the Egyptian Army and in 1966, he married Mona, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s third daughter. After a short stint in a junior position in the presidential press office, Marwan went to London to obtain an advanced degree in chemistry. There, he was rumored to have had a romance with the wife of a wealthy Kuwaiti sheik, who sponsored Marwan’s lavish lifestyle. President Nasser discovered the affair, ordered him back to Egypt and asked his daughter to divorce him. She refused. Back in Egypt, although Marwan managed to have his father-in-law, President Nasser, give him a few political assignments, Marwan never held a top position in Nasser’s regime.

In the spring of 1969, Marwan became a “walk in” spy for Israel. He approached the Israeli embassy in London and offered his clandestine services. After being rejected twice for fear of a trap, he was finally recruited. Included in the Israeli Mossad’s assessment of Marwan’s motives was the fact that he was greedy. He demanded $100,000 for each contact he made with Israel; on the other hand, he expressed disillusionment with his country. It is not farfetched to assume that Marwan was also bitter that President Nasser had not appointed him to high government positions.

As is usual in the case of walk-ins, the Mossad demanded that Marwan prove his new loyalty. And indeed, Marwan provided the Mossad with the record made of President Nasser’s secret visit to the Soviet Union on January 22, 1970, during which the president sought a Soviet supply of fighter jets. Then, President Nasser suddenly died in September 1970, of a heart attack at the age of 52, without having had a known history of cardiac ailments. Marwan’s career in the Egyptian government flourished when President Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser, leaving behind Ali Sabri, another contender to the presidency.

An intriguing coincidence – or not – is the fact that at Nasser’s funeral, both Anwar Sadat and Ali Sabri suffered heart attacks, which they survived. Was a heart attack ever recognized as a contagious disease?

Was there a conspiracy against President Nasser that ended with his sudden death, bringing Sadat to power with Marwan, his informant? In 2008, an Egyptian court in South Cairo rendered a judgment in favor of Ruqaya Sadat, daughter of late President Anwar Sadat, brought against Dr. Hoda Abdel Nasser, the daughter of Sadat’s predecessor. The judgment was for 150,000 Egyptian pounds, for slandering Sadat by accusing him of masterminding a plan to kill Gamal Abdel Nasser in order to succeed him.

In 1971, Marwan secretly informed President Sadat on Ali Sabri, a former head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, and former vice president, who was planning a coup together with others including Marwan’s immediate boss, Minister for Presidential Affairs Sami Sharaf. President Sadat gratefully gave Sharaf’s job to Marwan, which gave Marwan access to classified information.

Over the years, the secret information Marwan passed Israel included a report on the delivery to Egypt of Soviet Scud missiles, a report on a terrorist plan to attack an El Al plane in Rome and valuable information regarding Sadat’s meetings with Arab leaders.

However, the feather in Marwan’s hat from the Israeli perspective was his warning, 40 hours before Egypt and Syria’s sudden attack on Israel on Yom Kippur of 1973. In fact, Marwan was off only by a few hours.

The unprecedented claim, made by General Zeira in a press interview, that Marwan was a double agent was interpreted by many to create an alibi for Zeira for his failure to act on earlier warnings prior to the break of the 1973 war. He was accused of adhering to the “concept” that Egypt would not attack Israel until it obtained sufficient military power (which per Zeira’s assessment, was still inadequate), thereby ignoring warning signs. General Zvi Zamir, head of the Mossad during the Yom Kippur War and the personal recipient of the alert from Marwan 40 hours before the Egyptian attack, accused General Zeira of leaking top-secret information, and filed a criminal complaint against Zeira. In return, General Zeira filed, in 2005, a libel lawsuit against General Zamir. The case was removed to arbitration before the former deputy chief justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, Theodore Orr. In his judgment, Justice Orr accepted General Zamir’s version that Marwan had not doubled.

Was Marwan a double agent? On one hand, he gave Israel extremely valuable information that proved accurate. On the other hand, the fact that he volunteered in 1969 to serve Israel without being approached first is suspicious. It is a known fact that most embassies of certain countries are constantly observed from the outside. Israel’s embassy in London is probably not an exception. Furthermore, on October 6, 2004, when Egypt commemorated the October 1973 War, Marwan was viewed on Egyptian television shaking the hand of President Mubarak while they laid a wreath on Nasser’s tomb. This could indicate that Egypt does not consider Marwan a traitor, but rather a loyal Egyptian who managed to double-cross Israel.

Marwan’s wife insisted that he was murdered by Mossad agents and caused the British authorities to reopen the case. After hearing evidence and conducting an investigation, a British coroner, William Dolman, issued today an open verdict saying that there was no evidence to support allegations of murder. He added, “We simply don’t know the facts, despite careful investigation.”

The saga and mystery are unlikely to be put to rest, unless intelligence files become public. And that will not happen in our lifetime.

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 7/14/2010

Shahram Amiri, an Iranian nuclear scientist, went missing in May 2009 during a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Other than the fact that Amiri subsequently resurfaced in the U.S., almost everything else in the espionage-thriller style case is disputed publicly. The barrage of information offered during the past 5 weeks makes it difficult to distinguish between genuine information, disinformation and spins.

When Dr. Amiri went missing, there were reports that he had defected to the United States in a clandestine intelligence operation, while Iran claimed that he had been kidnapped. The case went almost completely off the media radar for more than a year.

Then on June 8, 2010, in a video clip broadcast on Iranian state media, a man claiming to be Dr. Amiri said he had been kidnapped by CIA agents during a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia in 2009. “They took me to a house located somewhere that I didn’t know. They gave me an anesthetic injection,” he said in the video. He then said that he was living in Tucson, Arizona, and had been subjected to eight months of “the most severe tortures and psychological pressures.”

On the same day, a different video clip was posted on YouTube, appearing to have been recorded by the same person, completely contradicting the version offered in the previous video. In the second video, the person claimed to be in the United States voluntarily to continue his education, “I am free here and I assure everyone that I am safe.”

In a third video broadcast on Iran state TV on June 29, 2010, a man appearing to be Dr. Amiri said, “I, Shahram Amiri, am a national of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a few minutes ago I succeeded in escaping U.S. security agents in Virginia. Presently, I am producing this video in a safe place. I could be re-arrested at any time.”

His last video statement coincided with the most recent development in this case: the announcement made by a Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman that confirmed Amiri’s arrival at its Washington embassy on July 13, at 6:30pm. The Pakistan Embassy in the United States hosts the Iran interests section, since Iran has no diplomatic ties with the U.S.

The Los Angeles Times reports that Mustafa Rahmani, head of the Iranian interests section, “is making arrangements for [Amiri's] repatriation back to Iran.” According to the BBC, Iran state radio reported Thursday, “A few hours ago Shahram Amiri took refuge at Iran’s interest section at the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, wanting to return to Iran immediately.”

The inescapable comparison of these events with the defection and re-defection case of Vitaly Yurchenko makes Amiri’s case seem even more bizarre.

Yurchenko, a 25-year veteran KGB officer in the Soviet Union, made a fake defection while working in Rome in 1985, ending up in the U.S. During his interrogations by U.S. intelligence community agents, he identified two Americans as KGB assets: Ronald Pelton, a National Security Agency employee, and Edward Lee Howard, a CIA case officer. The case took a strange turn when in November 1985, just before getting a meal at Au Pied de Cochon, a restaurant in Georgetown, Washington D.C., Yurchenko told the CIA agent accompanying him that he was taking a walk. However, he never returned. Shortly thereafter, Yurchenko appeared in a press conference, and announced that he had been kidnapped and drugged by the CIA. Back in Moscow, he was decorated by the Soviet government for the successful “infiltration operation.”

Questions:

1. Is the person taking refuge at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington D.C. in fact Dr. Amiri, the missing Iranian scientist?
2. If the person is indeed Dr. Amiri, how did he manage to escape? Wasn’t he being held in a safe, escape-proof environment guarded by U.S. intelligence community agents? Did he have outside or inside help?
3. If so, how did Dr. Amiri know to contact and identify his supporters? How did they know to contact and identify him? Was there a pre-arranged procedure of contact, which may support the sham defection theory?
4. Where was Dr. Amiri living? In Arizona, as he claimed in one video, or in Virginia, as he claimed in another video?
5. Whether living in Arizona or Virginia, how did he manage to get to Washington D.C.? Did he have money to pay for the trip? Was there a car waiting for him?
6. In the third video he said that he had escaped a few minutes earlier. If his claim is true, then it means that Dr. Amiri was moved to an Iranian “safe house” in Virginia not far from the location where he was being held by U.S. agents. Who prepared and maintained that “safe house?”
7. How did Dr. Amiri know to go to the Pakistani Embassy? Did anyone who was helping him know that the embassy serves as interest office for Iran?
8. Who filmed/made the videos in which Dr. Amiri claimed to have been kidnapped? You must have an account with YouTube to post. Has the CIA tracked the account holder?
9. Is Amiri trying to re-defect voluntarily, or is he yielding to Iran’s threats to harm his family members, whom he left behind in Iran?
10. Is the anonymous leak to the media that “Amiri operated as a CIA asset in Iran for several years before his defection, providing evidence that Iran continued a program to produce nuclear weapons,” a credible statement or a low blow by a spurned agency to make Amiri change his mind again and not attempt to return to Iran?

These and other nagging questions indicate that if the person inside the Pakistani Embassy is indeed Dr. Amiri, then there must be people within the United States who helped him. Could they be Iranian sleeper agents? How did Amiri know to contact them, or maybe they traced him? How? Was the defection and re-defection an elaborate Iranian ploy to smear the U.S. and deter other Iranian scientists who would seriously consider the U.S. an option if they wanted to defect?

Is it possible that Amiri did not escape from his captors as he alleged, but rather was dumped by the CIA after he gave all the information he had, and made unreasonable demands, making him a liability? If true, then he may have been driven by the CIA to the curb next to the Pakistani Embassy. Once inside the Iranian interests section, did he simply make up the kidnapping and escape stories to protect himself from the wrath of the unforgiving Iranian security services when he returns to Tehran, where he will have to provide plausible explanations or face hanging from a crane?

Answers anyone?

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 7/13/2010

Did Brigadier-General Mehdi Moini, who commands Iran’s Islamic Revolution’s Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Iranian West Azerbaijan province, fail to read events through, or was he conducting psychological counter-warfare? Moini was interviewed by the Iranian television channel Press TV, following media reports on the presence of American and Israeli forces in Azerbaijan along the borders of his province in northwest Iran. In that region, Iran has a 550-mile border with Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Moini said that IRGC mobilized its troops in the area and that his forces’ move has frustrated the enemy’s attempts to destabilize the western Iranian province. Moini claimed that while the enemy was damaged in the course of his movements, no Iranian base was compromised. Moini failed to identify the enemy, but claimed, “Certain Western countries” are muddying the water in Azerbaijan “by provoking ethnic and religious strife in the region and inciting terrorist groups, they seek to destabilize our province.”

Ethnic and religious strife? Really?

Is the real reason for the rumored presence of U.S. forces in Azerbaijan, “to destabilize western Iran?” Is General Moini reading his maps correctly? It would be interesting to hear his explanation about the reported concentration of U.S. forces, and its allies’ warships, in the Persian Gulf, near Iran’s southern borders, more than a thousand miles away from his province. Would he call it “a fishing expedition?”

Is General Moini that naive?

King Solomon, the wisest of all men, said in Proverbs 27:22, “Though thou shouldest bray a fool in a mortar with a pestle among groats, yet will not his foolishness depart from him.”

The Jewish Sages offer an interpretation of the verse: Although the fool acknowledges that he’s being ground in the mortar, he claims that the hulled grains around him are the target of the pestle, while he just happens to be there.

Since neither Moini nor his employers are fools, his remarks can be interpreted as a response in-kind to what Iran sees as psychological warfare, rather than a genuine threat.

Whether Iran misreads what the naked eye can see, or says one thing while readying itself for a military clash, if the reports on troop concentration in southern and northwestern Iran are accurate, then they reflect a serious and ominous step toward a potential military confrontation with Iran.

The rapid deterioration of U.S. and NATO relations with Turkey accelerated its pace when news about troops’ concentration in Azerbaijan started developing. Has Azerbaijan’s choice demonstrated the U.S.’s increased concern that Turkey is turning east toward Iran and therefore cannot be relied upon should U.S.-Iran hostilities commence?

There is no doubt that the region is simmering. Recently, there were separate visits to Israel by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Leon Panetta and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Arab sources claimed that the meetings in Israel focused on Iran’s nuclear program. Did these visits and the concentration of troops imply preparations for an imminent military confrontation with Iran? U.S. government officials routinely deny any current U.S. plans to attack Iran, but should the Iranians believe U.S. declarations or read their own intelligence reports regarding the West’s military presence in the region?

Should the Iranians have a genuine cause for concern? Given the data, you can decide for yourself: There are more than 30 U.S. military installations encircling Iran on all sides, from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the north, to Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan in the southeast, and Afghanistan and Pakistan in the northeast. Just last month there were extensive naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea of U.S., British, French and other nations’ forces.

French Rafale F3 fighter jets carrying the nuclear-tipped ASMP/A missiles trained ‘touch and go’ landing on the USS Harry S. Truman, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; U.S. pilots flew French Super Etendard fighter jets, landing them on the French Charles De Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; French pilots flew U.S. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, landing them on the USS Harry S. Truman.

The U.S. Navy’s deployment near Iran is significant. It includes USS Nassau, an amphibious assault ship carrying AV-8B Harrier attack planes, AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters, CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters and 3,000 U.S. Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The U.S. force also includes USS Mesa Verde, carrying 800 U.S. Marines and USS Ashlan. These warships join the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group, which includes 12 warships. The U.S. naval force is deployed in the Persian Gulf near Chahbahar, not far from the Iran-Pakistan border where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s naval base is located. West of this location, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Strike Group is patrolling.

There were reports that the U.S. was moving 387 bunker-buster bombs, as well as 195 smart Blu-110 bombs and 192 huge 2,000 pound Blu-117 bombs, from California to the U.S. base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, in preparation for a possible attack on Iranian nuclear installations that are deep in the ground and protected by several meters of enforced concrete.

There were reports that Greece allowed Israeli jets to train in its air space, which coincidentally – or not – is the same distance from Israel as Iran, a necessary training should Israel target Iranian nuclear reactors. Other Iranian sources report that Israel has concentrated fighter jets in Azerbaijan, and previously there were persistent rumors that Israel maintains military satellite monitoring equipment in Azerbaijan, and is allowed to run listening devices near the Iranian border and on the shores of the Caspian Sea. Last month, Egypt allowed an Israeli Dolphin nuclear submarine to cross the Suez Canal toward the Persian Gulf.

In parallel, there are reports that a significant number of Iranian tanks and antiaircraft artillery were redeployed near the Iranian border with Azerbaijan and took additional preparations should hostilities break.

One unintended consequence of the massive naval force deployment in the Gulf is the surprise cancellation of the Iranian plan to send a ship with aid to Gaza. Under the U.N. Security Council’s recent resolution, all Iranian ships are subject to stop and search. Perhaps the Iranians planned to stock the ship with more than just bags of flour and rice?

There is no doubt that the U.S.’s and allies’ moves are meant to signal to the Iranians that they mean business. Either the Iranians abandon their nuclear armament plans, or the West will destroy their facilities. In such a showdown, reminiscent of the high noon duel in Hollywood Westerns, the parties must remember – before the situation develops into a full-fledged, regional war – the foreshadowing saying attributed to the Russian playwright Anton Chekhov: “If in the first act you have hung a pistol on the wall, then in the following one it should be fired. Otherwise don’t put it there.”

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 7/12/2010

If the rumors are substantiated, then the swap would be the biggest since the end of the Cold War. There are, however, a few questions that must be asked. First and foremost: What’s the rush?

It has been barely two weeks since the alleged Russian sleeper cell was arrested. The investigation is probably still at its embryonic stage, although the sleepers have been under FBI surveillance for several years. Nonetheless, once 10 of the 11 suspects are in custody, the FBI and other law enforcement agents have a unique opportunity to question the suspects and get answers to tough questions. The most important being: What other Russian spies are working clandestinely in the U.S.?

Given the poor compartmentalization of the sleepers, the FBI should be able to obtain from them investigative leads to find additional spies and “deep cover” Russian agents of influence. Avoiding the risk of facing up to 20 years in a federal prison is a strong enough incentive for the sleepers to sing songs for the FBI. However, if the suspected sleepers find out about Moscow’s rushed activity to conduct a swap with the U.S., their mouths will be permanently sealed.

Why bother to talk or cooperate? Why bother to negotiate a plea bargain if they know that soon the U.S. federal prison’s doors will open, and that they will walk with impunity?

The U.S. has a clear interest in the release of its own spies who are languishing in Russian prisons. However, these spies were already interrogated, tried, convicted and sentenced years ago. They were “peeled like an onion” as per Intel speak; therefore the Russians have no use for them. In contrast, there’s the question about the Russian sleepers. Why are the Russians rushing to swap them? Do they care that their citizens might find the prison’s food inedible? Perhaps they won’t have enough blankets? Or are the Russians concerned that the sleepers will talk and talk and turn in other Russian plants thus far uncovered by the U.S.? Maybe the Russians are concerned that the sleepers will reveal Russian training methods? Names of others trained with them in Russia? Emergency procedures?

These are golden nuggets of information that U.S. investigators are mining as these words are written. And if this is the case, the U.S. should not rush the swap and should definitely keep the sleepers who are currently in custody in isolation without outside contact. A Bedouin proverb says: “The rush is a satanic trait.” There’s a world of truth in these words.

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 7/08/2010

Recently, seemingly compassionate and well meaning individuals and organizations (well, some of them at least) loaded a flotilla of ships bound for Gaza with humanitarian aid for the Palestinians under an Israeli maritime blockade. The ships carried food, medicines and other supplies the organizers thought the Gazans badly needed. (Rockets, explosives and ammunition were left behind. The Gazans have plenty).

Do the Gazans really need the humanitarian cargo? Unlikely. Look at the facts: Although Gaza is probably the densest area in the world, its residents seem to fare much better than the world’s average on many key factors, and definitely better than Iran or Turkey. Let’s start with the basics. Infant mortality: In Iran 35.8 out of 1,000 babies die at birth or during their first year, probably due to poor health care for mother and child. In Turkey the rate is 25.78 dead babies per 1,000 live births. What is the rate in Gaza? 18.35 deaths per 1,000, almost half of the rate in Iran and 30% less than that of Turkey. And how long are the surviving babies expected to live? In Gaza, to age 73.42, in Iran to age 71.14 and in Turkey to age 71.8.

Another relevant indicator is literacy rate, which reflects the country’s investment in education. In Gaza the literacy rate is 91.9%, but in Turkey it’s 88.7% and in Iran only 82.3%.

Interestingly, twice as many Palestinians living in the Palestinian Autonomy in the West Bank live above the poverty line than do their brothers in Gaza. This is likely because of the economic cooperation and almost completely open economic borders between Israel and the Autonomy. Cooperation has its benefits.

Is Gaza a paradise? Hardly. There are poor people, high unemployment and a growing uncertainty regarding the future. But there are also rich people – very rich indeed, like in any other society. In fact, in many respects, the Palestinians in Gaza are better off than their brothers in refugee camps in Lebanon who, for example, cannot even build new houses in the refugee camps under a Lebanese government ban.

Nonetheless, Palestinians in Gaza live in a pressure cooker. Their borders are sealed on all sides, by Israel and by Egypt, which doesn’t want any Islamic Brotherhood supporters from Gaza stirring more violence in Egypt. Hamas’s ideological partners assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Saadat and promise the same fate to his successors. On the other side of the border is Israel, which can’t be expected to feed the mouth that bites it (although much of the world’s media and people with an agenda seem to suggest that it do just this).

If you still wonder why Israel blockades the Gaza Strip and permits only goods that cannot support terror into the area, think of the 8,000 rockets, mortars and missiles that were fired indiscriminately from Gaza on Israeli civilian villages and towns, at a time that no part of the Gaza Strip was held by Israel. Israel’s subsequent 2008 attack on the Gaza Strip in operation Cast Lead significantly reduced the Palestinians’ will to continue shelling Israel.

Israel’s continued blockade is intended to guarantee that additional weapons and ammunition do not enter Gaza, should the Palestinians’ will to attack Israeli civilians ever reemerge. There is also the matter of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier kidnapped from Israeli territory and held hostage by Hamas for the past four years. Has he received humanitarian help? Humanitarian attention maybe? Perhaps allowed a single visit by the Red Cross? Don’t hold your breath. Hamas is not held to any humanitarian standard by the humanitarian aid flotilla organizers.

Is there hope for change in Gaza? Not until Hamas, a designated terror organization, is thrown out of power by the Palestinian people, or until Hamas ceases to be an Iranian agent in the region with a declared intention to destroy Israel. Its Charter spells it out clearly: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”

Palestinians in Gaza don’t need those shipments any more than Iran and Turkey do. The aid the Palestinians actually need from the outside in order to effect long-term change is guidance and help to change their political plight -which brings misery to many – not shipments of bags of flour and rice.

So, why were Turkish and Iranian organizations sending token humanitarian aid to Gaza when their own people are needier? They probably never heard of the Old Jewish Sages’ proverb concerning charity: The poor in your own city come first. However, those sending the flotilla to Gaza certainly listened to the immortal words Mario Puzo wrote for the Mafia Godfather Don Coreleone: “It’s all personal, every bit of business. Every piece of shit every man has to eat every day of his life is personal. They call it business. OK. But it’s personal as hell.”

The conclusion is painfully clear: It’s not a brotherly love for the Palestinians that motivated the Turkish and Iranian organizations and their backers, but their hatred for the Israelis and cynical political maneuvering on the backs of the Palestinians, abandoned by their Islamic brothers for 62 years and counting. Not only the pawn of Hamas, the Palestinians are now being further exploited by the Turks and Iranians.

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 7/06/2010

This week the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New York filed criminal complaints against ten alleged Russian sleeper agents in the U.S. Although the cases concern U.S. national security, the sleepers were not indicted for espionage but rather for lesser charges of money laundering related felonies and for failure to register as foreign agents, under a law primarily intended for lobbyists representing foreign countries. With the indictment arises a natural question: What was the Russian agents’ purpose in the U.S.?

SVR, the Russian intelligence service, successor to the KGB, spelled out their mission in a 2009 message to two of the defendants. The message was intercepted and decrypted by the FBI and reads, in part, as follows: You were sent to USA for long-term service trip. Your education, bank accounts, car, house etc. – all these serve one goal: fulfill your main mission, i.e. to search and develop ties in policymaking circles in US and send intels [intelligence reports] to C[enter].

The sleepers’ assignment was – if the intercepted message is credible and not a Russian disinformation decoy – to become “agents of influence,” serving the interests of a foreign country, as directed by its intelligence services. These agents, directly or indirectly spread propaganda or disinformation to contacts in rival intelligence agencies, to the general public through the media or to an unwitting highly placed – often political – contact, who would then be manipulated to take actions that advance foreign interests.

But were they trained to influence or recruit influencers? Hardly.

According to the FBI, the sleepers were trained to conduct agent-to-agent communications, to use brush-passes (a clandestine, hand-to-hand delivery of money or documents when one person walks past another in a “flash meeting” in a public place), to run short-wave radio operations and to use invisible writing and codes and ciphers. The training also covered Morse code, the creation and use of a cover profession, counter-surveillance measures, concealment and destruction of equipment and materials used in connection with clandestine work and the avoidance of detection. The FBI further asserts that defendants used steganography to hide data in images. Steganographic software that is not commercially available allowed the SVR and sleepers to communicate by embedding encrypted, invisible data in images that are located on publicly accessible websites; the data is of course detectable and decipherable with the right software. The sleepers also used radiograms, coded bursts of data sent by a radio transmitter that can be picked up by a radio receiver set to the proper frequency. As they are being transmitted, radiograms generally sound like the transmission of Morse code.

This is quintessential espionage training. Period.

Indeed, according to the FBI, the sleepers were performing traditional intelligence-gathering work, such as collecting information on small yield, high penetration nuclear warheads and data about Central Intelligence Agency job applicants.

The FBI concedes that the sleepers were under surveillance for several years, but the Department of Justice fell short of accusing them of espionage, which carries a life sentence. Why the lighter charge? Likely the evidence gathered thus far has been deemed insufficient to substantiate espionage.

The discrepancy between the content of the 2009 encrypted message and the alleged activity of the sleepers could mean that their assignment was a mixed bag of espionage and simultaneous preparations to become deeply rooted in American society until they could be effective agents of influence. If this assumption is accurate, the Russians have broken a basic intelligence rule that separates the gatherers from the influencers. Agents of influence are simply more likely to be influential when they assume a purportedly legit, visible and traditionally influential cover/profession, instead of the deeper covers used for intelligence-gathering purposes.

It is also possible that the sleepers – while “sleeping” – were kept busy with intelligence assignments from their Russian handlers, until they became ready to recruit assets for the influence job. There have been cases in which sleepers had little or no contact with their handlers and liked their new country so much, that they decided to remain asleep, living comfortably and hoping that their handlers would ultimately forget about them.

Professionals or amateurs? According to the FBI, at least one of the sleepers was rather clumsy. Anna Chapman believed an undercover FBI agent posing as a Russian Consulate employee and agreed to receive operating instructions from him. She even gave him her spy-tooled laptop for repair. The laptop was used, according to the FBI, to radio-exchange data with another laptop carried by a Russian official from a short distance. The FBI does not disclose how the undercover FBI agent managed to gain Chapman’s trust, but it appears that Chapman acted as a complete amateur when she fell for the FBI’s brilliant maneuver. Undercover operatives on a clandestine assignment in a foreign country are trained to avoid unsolicited contacts made by anyone, unless their handler has alerted them to the new contact’s identity, and the contact has confirmed the pre-determined code sentences (usually more than one) or other identification process, to guarantee his legitimacy. According to the FBI, all Chapman said initially was, “I just need to get some more information about you before I can talk.” And when the undercover FBI agent replied, “I work in the same department as you, but I work here in the consulate. Okay. My name is Roman. My name is Roman, I work in the consulate.” This exchange seems to have satisfied Chapman.

Incredibly, Chapman received (and followed) from the same undercover FBI agent instructions to approach another woman for the purpose of delivering a false passport. The instructions were: [The other woman] “will tell you… ‘Excuse me, but haven’t we met in California last summer?’ And you will say to her, ‘No, I think it was the Hamptons.’” Chapman asked, “The Hamptons?” and the FBI agent said, “The Hamptons and that is it. That is how you know and you just exchange, just give her the document [the fraudulent passport].” Didn’t it occur to Chapman that she failed to observe a similar identification procedure, before she exposed herself as a clandestine operative to a complete stranger who turned out to be an FBI agent?

In contrast, another defendant maintained the in-agent contact identification procedure with an undercover FBI agent before he agreed to perform a clandestine job. Neither the FBI affidavits nor the Complaint disclose how the FBI discovered the code sentences that would allow the two to discuss business openly.

In Intel speak, a “legal” operative is often a foreign diplomat stationed in a foreign country, also engaging in an illegal activity such as espionage. If caught, his diplomatic or consular immunity will save him from trial, and all the host country can do is declare him a PNG – persona non grata – and deport him. An “illegal” agent is a spy provided with a new, false identity along with a cover story – a legend. Usually his fraudulent documents give the illegal the identity of a legitimate citizen or legal resident of a country other than the sending country. “Illegals” are instructed to have a normal lifestyle, maintain innocuous employment and join relevant professional associations; sometimes, “illegals” operate in pairs and live and work together in the host country under the guise of a married couple and even have children.

It appears that the Russians have broken a covert work rule: never allow contacts between “legals” and “illegals.” If one of them is under counterintelligence surveillance – most probably the “legal,” then his encounter with the “illegal” would immediately contaminate and expose the “illegal.” Nonetheless, Russian officials in the U.S. met with the sleepers. “Elementary, my dear Watson,” Sherlock Holmes would have probably declared.

Did the sleepers pose a genuine risk to the U.S.’s national security? Sleeper cells tend to wake up when orders are given to carry out a mission. It could be collecting intelligence or recruiting assets, but there are also more ominous and heinous tasks than just gathering information or influencing politicians. Until the sleepers’ full story is revealed, it will be unclear why the Russians spent the effort and money, and took a significant political risk, to place the ring in the U.S.

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 06/30/2010

On May 14, 1876, the New York Times ridiculed the Ottoman Empire, reminding its readers that “It is now some twenty years since we began to hear about the ’sick man upon the Bosphorus,’ yet the same sort of talk, under somewhat different conditions, is current today. The Ottoman Empire seems to have as many lives as the popular saying attributes to a cat, but seven or eight of those lives must have been already forfeited.” The article, which referred to the Ottoman arrogance and lack of diplomacy in dealing with a Bulgarian insurgency, signaled the beginning of the Ottoman Empire’s end.

The last Sultans ruled as autocrats, oppressing millions. The Empire was notoriously corrupt and their loyal supporters few in number. As self-proclaimed “Successors of the Prophet,” the sultans advocated strict Islamic ideology and pan-Islamism headed by their own supreme authority, thus conflicting with the liberal, secular ideals of the “Young Turk” movement and the West. Recognizing that they could not survive against the invading Russians, who sensed the Empire’s weakness, and minority uprisings from groups like the Armenians, the Ottomans turned to Germany for help. Aligning with the Germans proved fatal; Germany and Turkey lost World War I, the Empire was carved up, and what remained became Turkey under the helm of Atatürk in 1923.

Some 150 years after Turkey’s predecessor was labeled the “Sick Man Upon the Bosphorus,” Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is promoting a policy reminiscent of the years leading to the demise of the Ottoman Empire — choosing the wrong side in a conflict and misreading historical events.

Turkey has changed political course in more than one arena: it is ending a friendly relationship with Israel after decades of maintaining strong mutual military, trade and tourist ties; it put the Russians on guard by entering into a uranium enrichment agreement with Iran; and its relationships with NATO and the U.S. are at all-time lows. Turkey’s hopes of becoming the first Islamic member of the EU were reduced to ashes, and its aspiration to resolve the Cyprus occupation collapsed when Derviş Eroğlu, a Turkish nationalist, was recently elected leader of northern Cyprus. In eastern Turkey, talks with the Kurdish rebels fell apart, and clashes between the Kurds and the Turkish Army ensue.

Although each segment of Turkey’s international policy may seem independently driven, put together they paint a clear picture. Getting a cold shoulder from the West on several fronts, Erdoğan is opting for the warm reception of Iran and other proponents of a pan-Islamism.

This switch in allegiance is not sudden, nor incidental. As close ties with Israel were in place when he took office, Erdoğan leveraged them to “make nice” with Europe and the U.S., hoping to ease Turkey’s admission into the European Union by showing EU members they had no reason to fear an Islamic Turkey. At that point, despite being governed by a leader of the Islamic Party, Erdoğan implied, Turkey showed through its relations with Israel that its religion did not interfere with sober politics. When EU members remained unconvinced, pressuring Turkey to withdraw from northern Cyprus and end its oppression of the Kurds in Eastern Turkey, Erdoğan turned to a more welcoming ally, Islamic Iran.

By marking Israel as the villain, Erdoğan hopes to achieve several strategic goals, the primary being his own political survival. With a parliamentary election forthcoming in November 2011, and a majority win for his party unlikely, Erdoğan needed a rallying cry for unity. Like the 1881 Russian rioters’ outcry following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, “Kill the Jews and Save Russia,” Erdoğan is promoting Islamic solidarity with the Palestinians, much to the chagrin of the Turkish military, a staunchly secular body.

Systematically curtailing the military’s traditional role as protector of secular Turkey, as declared by Atatürk, the creator of modern Turkey, and as made clear in the Constitution, is a well-planned part of Erdoğan’s strategy. That the Turkish military has always advocated strong ties with Israel is yet another reason for Erdoğan to limit its influence, which he did by appointing two radical Muslim civilians to key military and intelligence positions: Hakan Fidan as head of MIT, Turkey’s foreign intelligence service, and Muammer Güler as Undersecretary for Public Order and Security, which heads Turkey’s counterterrorism.

The Turkish-Israeli conflict has now taken on a life of its own, fueled by Erdoğan’s self-imposed role as the champion of Gaza’s Hamas government and ultimate leader of the Islamic world. He will soon discover that it’s a pretty crowded rung, particularly as the Iranians see themselves as sole leaders. In a Turkish-Iranian race for Islamic hegemony, Turkey may find itself losing, and end up with nothing, least of all the West’s support, which Erdoğan is now sacrificing.

The last Sultans of the Ottoman Empire had similar global aspirations. History stands witness to the demise that followed.

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 06/16/2010